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Gender and the Nuclear Weapons State: 
A Feminist Critique of the UK Government’s White Paper on Trident 
 
Abstract: This paper enquires into the connections between gender and discourses of 
the nuclear weapons state. Specifically, we develop an analysis of the ways in which 
gender operates in the White Paper published by the UK Government in 2006 on its 
plans to renew Trident nuclear weapons (given the go-ahead by the Westminster 
Parliament in March 2007). We argue that the White Paper mobilises masculine-
coded language and symbols in several ways: firstly, in its mobilisation of techno-
strategic rationality and axioms; secondly, in its assumptions about security; and, 
thirdly, in its assumptions about the state as actor. Taken together, these function to 
construct a masculinised identity for the British nuclear state as a ‘responsible 
steward’. However, this identity is one that is not yet securely fixed and that, indeed, 
contains serious internal tensions that opponents of Trident (and of the nuclear state 
more generally), should be able to exploit.  
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Gender and the Nuclear Weapons State: 
A Feminist Critique of the UK Government’s White Paper on Trident 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper enquires into the connections between gender and discourses of the nuclear 
weapons state. Specifically, we develop an analysis of the ways in which gender 
operates in the recent White Paper, The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear 
Deterrent 
1
, which details the UK Government’s plans to renew Trident nuclear 
weapons. We argue that the White Paper mobilises masculine-saturated codes and 
symbols about nuclear weapons, security and the state, in ways that show both 
continuity and change with the past and that function overall to construct a 
masculinised identity for the contemporary British nuclear state as a ‘responsible 
steward’.2 However, this identity is one that is not yet securely fixed; indeed, the 
codes and symbols of masculinity in the text are unstable and contradictory in ways 
that critics of Trident renewal should be able to exploit. There is space here for 
feminist analysis to contribute to the ongoing opposition to Trident and the nuclear 
weapons state more generally.
3
 
 
                                                 
1. Cm 6994. 2006. The Future of the UK's Nuclear Deterrent. Presented to Parliament by The 
Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, By 
Command of Her Majesty. London: The Stationary Office. Online at 
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AC00DD79-76D6-4FE3-91A1-
6A56B03C092F/0/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf (last accessed 04/06/2008). 
2. Although it may be technically more correct to use UK rather than Britain (the UK being the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), when we use ‘British’ in this article it should be taken 
to mean ‘belonging to the UK’.  
3. In this spirit, the first draft of this paper was presented at the Second International Faslane Academic 
Conference and Blockade, held outside Faslane Naval Base, Scotland, 27 June 2007. 
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We write from the perspective of a ‘feminist anti-militarism’,4 which ‘rejects both the 
military and political use of weapons of mass destruction in warfare or for deterrence. 
It is also deeply critical of the discourses which have framed public discussion of 
weapons of mass destruction’.5 Developing out of a long tradition of feminist 
involvement in peace and anti-war movements,
6
 this position is feminist because it 
sees gender as playing a key role in war, in the culture of readiness and enthusiasm 
for war known as militarism, and in the reliance on ‘weapons of mass destruction’ 
like Trident.  
 
What is gender? Feminists now offer multiple and sometimes conflicting accounts of 
this key concept.
7
 Following Carol Cohn, perhaps the most important writer on gender 
and nuclear weapons, we want to emphasise three dimensions here.
8
 Firstly, gender as 
a category helps us understand the ways in which individual (and collective) identity 
is socially constructed around and through assumptions about male/female sexual 
difference, or the categories of masculinity and femininity. Secondly, gender is ‘a way 
of structuring relations of power’,9 one which most feminists agree ‘shows constancy 
in assigning greater value to that which is associated with masculinity and lesser value 
to that associated with femininity … the terms are not independent but form a 
                                                 
4. Cynthia Cockburn, 2003. “Why Feminist Anti-Militarism?,” Women in Black. Online at 
http://www.womeninblack.org.uk/Feminist%20Antimilitarism.htm (last accessed 04/06/2008). 
5. Carol Cohn and Sara Ruddick,  “A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 
in S. Lee and S. Hasmi (eds) Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), online at: 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/wappp/research/working/cohn_ruddick.pdf (accessed 08/06/2007). 
6. e.g. Sasha Roseneil, Disarming Patriarchy: Feminism and Political Action at Greenham, 
(Buckingham: Open University Press, 1995). 
7. e.g. Judith Squires, Gender in Political Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) and Barbara 
Marshall, Configuring Gender: Explorations in Theory and Practice (Peterborough, Ontario: 
Broadview Press, 2000), ch 2. 
8. Carol Cohn, with Felicity Hill and Sara Ruddick, “The Relevance of Gender for Eliminating 
Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Disarmament Diplomacy Issue 80, 1-3, Autumn (2005), online at: 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd80/80ccfhsr.htm (accessed 08/07/2006). 
9. Ibid  
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hierarchical (unequal) relation’.10 Thirdly, ‘gender also functions as a symbolic 
system: our ideas about gender permeate and shape our ideas about many other 
aspects of society beyond male-female relations—including politics, weapons, and 
warfare’.11 This means that discourses about nuclear weapons, amongst other things, 
are infused with a series of conceptual dichotomies which flow from and underpin the 
primary signifiers of masculine/feminine, with the masculine side of the dichotomy 
favoured over the feminine.  
 
We would add that feminist work has increasingly insisted on the complexity with 
which gender operates, intersecting with other forms of power and identity in context-
specific ways. This means that we should not fall into the trap of thinking that there is 
only one form of masculinity and one of femininity—rather there are multiple 
versions of each, some of which are more dominant, or ‘hegemonic’, than others at 
particular places and times.
12
 As a result, we should expect a particular gendered 
discourse to construct and mobilise markers and symbols of multiple and even 
conflicting masculinities and femininities.  
 
There exists an extensive feminist critique of the nuclear weapons state, most of it 
generated during and focused on the Cold War period and particularly the roles and 
rhetoric of the superpowers at that time. What remains a pertinent question is the 
extent to which such feminist arguments can illuminate the more contemporary, 
British, case with which we are concerned in this paper. The UK jumped on the 
                                                 
10. V. Spike Peterson, and Anne Sisson Runyan, Global Gender Issues (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1993), p.7. 
11. Carol Cohn, with Felicity Hill and Sara Ruddick, “The Relevance of Gender for Eliminating 
Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Disarmament Diplomacy Issue 80, 1, Autumn (2005) p.2, online at: 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd80/80ccfhsr.htm (last accessed 04/06/2008). 
12. R.W.Connell, Gender and Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); R.W. Connell, Masculinities 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 
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nuclear bandwagon early in the Cold War, allying itself closely to the US in order not 
only to contest a perceived Soviet threat but also to continue to project its power on a 
global stage at a time when it was losing its empire. In the latter stages of the Cold 
War, a belligerent Conservative Party government under Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher renewed the UK’s commitment to nuclear weapons, facilitating the 
establishment of US nuclear bases in the UK and upgrading British weapons to the 
current Trident system. In opposition during this period, the Labour Party was initially 
strongly wedded to the cause of unilateral nuclear disarmament. By the time it came 
to power in 1997, however, ‘New’ Labour had dropped this commitment to 
disarmament, to the continuing consternation of its left wing. The New Labour 
government of Prime Minister Tony Blair may have articulated a commitment to an 
‘ethical’ dimension to its foreign policy13 but disarmament has not been part of this 
agenda. Indeed, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Blair’s efforts to reinforce the 
relationship with the US in its ‘War on Terror’, and involvement in US-led military 
action in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Labour government (now under Gordon Brown) is 
more wedded than ever to the British nuclear ‘deterrent’. It is in this context that the 
White Paper on the renewal of Trident was published. The plans outlined within it 
were ultimately approved in March 2007 by the Westminster Parliament but only after 
a sizeable Labour Party rebellion, and they continue to garner controversy, 
particularly in Scotland, where all current British Trident submarines are based.
14
  
 
                                                 
13. Cook, R., 1997. “Robin Cook’s Speech on the Government’s Ethical Foreign Policy”. Online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/indonesia/Story/0,2763,190889,00.html (last accessed 04/06/2008) 
14. See BBC, 2007,‘Trident Plans Win Commons Support’, online at  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6448173.stm (last accessed 05/06/2008); Lindsay Gilmour, 
006,‘Faslane’s Trident Dilemma’, The Politics Show Scotland, online at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nolpda/ifs_news/hi/newsid_6211000/6211510.stm (last accessed 05/06/2008);  
The Scottish Government, 2007, ‘Trident in Scotland’, online at 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2007/10/22111017 (last accessed 05/06/2008).  
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In what follows, we develop our analysis of the discourse in the White Paper in three 
parts. In the first, we discuss the representations of nuclear weapons technology in the 
White Paper; in the second, its arguments about security; and, in the third, its 
assumptions about the role of the state. We draw on feminist critiques of the Cold 
War nuclear arms race to make our analysis but also more broadly on recent feminist 
literature within the discipline of International Relations (IR) and sociological debates 
on multiple masculinities. We use this work to illuminate the gendered underpinnings 
of the White Paper; in so doing, we also aim to demonstrate the significance of 
feminism as an essential part of the ongoing struggle against the UK government’s 
addiction to nuclear weapons―and against the nuclear weapons state more generally. 
 
Part 1: Gender and Nuclear Weapons Technology 
 
We begin by looking at the way the White Paper talks about nuclear weapons 
technology. There are three strands to the feminist critique of the way in which states 
in general talk about nuclear weapons technology: first, the deployment of sexualised, 
phallic imagery; second, a tendency to abstraction; and, third, a reliance on gendered 
axioms. On the first point, feminists have long highlighted that the political and 
military power associated with nuclear weapons is linked metaphorically with sexual 
potency and masculinity. This linkage is neither arbitrary nor trivial: sexual metaphors 
are a way of mobilising gendered associations in order to create excitement about, 
support for and identification with both the weapons and the political regime 
possessing them.
15
 Thus feminist histories of the development of the nuclear arms 
race in the decades after World War Two demonstrate the extent to which it was a 
                                                 
15. Carol Cohn, with Felicity Hill and Sara Ruddick, “The Relevance of Gender for Eliminating 
Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Disarmament Diplomacy Issue 80, 1, Autumn (2005), p.4, online at 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd80/80ccfhsr.htm (last accessed 05/06/2008).  
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race to prove masculine prowess, fuelled by ‘missile’ envy,16 with the nuclear 
weapons of the Cold War superpowers ‘wheeled out like monumental phalluses’ on 
parade.
17
 Such imagery has proved seductive to many governments across time and 
space. Thus when India exploded five nuclear devices in May 1998, Hindu nationalist 
leader Balashaheb Thakeray argued that ‘[w]e have to prove that we are not eunuchs’ 
and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee was portrayed in a newspaper cartoon as 
propping up his coalition with a nuclear bomb, captioned ‘Made with Viagra’18. 
Indeed, as Indian novelist Arundhati Roy has commented: 
 
Reading the papers, it was often hard to tell when people were referring to 
Viagra (which was competing for second place on the front pages) and when 
they were talking about the bomb―‘We have superior strength and 
potency.’19 
 
Similar language has permeated the nuclear discourse of the military and defence 
industry. In her ground-breaking study of the discourse of American defence 
intellectuals who formulated nuclear weapons policy during the Cold War, Cohn 
                                                 
16. Helen Caldicott, Missile Envy: The Arms Race and Nuclear War (New York: Bantam, 1984) and 
Brian Easlea, Fathering the Unthinkable: Masculinity, Scientists and the Nuclear Arms Race (London: 
Pluto, 1983). 
17. Cynthia Cockburn, “The Gender Dynamic”, Peace News Issue 2443, June-August, (2001), online 
at: http://www.peacenews.info/issues/2443/guested_gd.html (last accessed 05/06/2008). 
18. Cited in: Carol Cohn with Felicity Hill and Sara Ruddick. “The Relevance of Gender for 
Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Disarmament Diplomacy Issue 80, 1, Autumn (2005) p.4, 
online at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd80/80ccfhsr.htm (accessed 8/7/06) 
19. Arundhati Roy, The Cost of Living (London: Flamingo, 1999), p.136. See also Sikata Banerjee. 
Warriors in Politics: Hindu Nationalism, Violence, and the Shiv Sena in Mumbai (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1999), pp.172-80; Amrita Basu and Rekha Basu, “Of Men, Women, and 
Bombs:Engendering India's Nuclear Explosions,” online at http://pagesperso-
orange.fr/sacw/saan/AmritaBasu.html (last accessed 30/09/2008); and Rupa Ozal, The Making of 
Neoliberal India: Nationalism, Gender, and the Paradoxes of Globalization (London: Routledge, 
2006), Chapter 5. 
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noted that sexualised metaphors, phallic imagery and the promise of sexual 
domination thrived.
20
 Lectures were dominated by discussion of:  
 
vertical erector launchers, thrust-to-weight ratios, soft lay downs, deep 
penetration, and the comparative advantages of protracted versus spasm 
attacks—or what one military adviser to the National Security Council has 
called ‘releasing 70 to 80 percent of our megatonnage in one orgasmic 
whump’.21 
 
Cohn suggests that such sexual imagery serves not only to underline the connections 
between masculine sexuality and nuclear weapons but also to minimize the 
seriousness of militarist endeavours.
22
 It makes the nuclear arms race seem the stuff of 
jocular locker-room rivalry, denying its deadly consequences. Perhaps most 
importantly, sexualised metaphors are one of the reasons that talk of nuclear 
disarmament is so readily dismissed. ‘If disarmament is emasculation, how could any 
real man even consider it?’.23  
 
The attachment of masculine potency to nuclear weapons can be seen to some extent 
in the White Paper, particularly when the more technological aspects of the proposed 
Trident renewal are discussed. Thus, for example, we note the roll call of past 
submarine names: Astute, Resolution, Swiftsure and Vanguard, connoting strength, 
                                                 
20. Carol Cohn, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defence Intellectuals,” Signs: Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society 12:4 (1987), pp.687-8 
21. Ibid, p. 693. 
22. Ibid, p. 696. 
23. Ibid.  p.693. 
9 
resolve and action.
24
 The accompanying pictures recall the phallic iconography of the 
Cold War, with a Vanguard submarine emerging from foaming water and a missile 
being test fired into the sky.
25
 Reference in this section and in technical discussion 
elsewhere in the paper is frequently made to the greater range and payload of 
contemporary ballistic missiles. Nonetheless, our overall impression is that the 
mobilisation of sexualised, masculine language and imagery is significantly more 
muted in the White Paper than feminist critics would perhaps expect. It would seem 
that there is a deliberate avoidance here of the more obviously masculine arguments 
and sexual metaphors, such as those about potency and penetration. Perhaps this is 
unsurprising from a Government that claims to have been more open to feminist 
arguments than its predecessors.
26
 
 
Although it may not brandish more overt phallic imagery, it seems to us that the 
Government has not fully relinquished the masculine-coded prestige and status that is 
associated with the celebration of firepower. Although the White Paper explicitly 
denies this, again perhaps due to an awareness of the feminist critique, arguing  that 
‘we maintain our nuclear forces as a means of deterring acts of aggression and not for 
reasons of status’,27 its acknowledgement of the special treatment afforded to nuclear 
weapons states indicates there is still pride in belonging to the club: ‘The NPT 
                                                 
24. See Section 1 of  Cm 6994. 2006. The Future of the UK's Nuclear Deterrent. Presented to 
Parliament by The Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, By Command of Her Majesty. London: The Stationary Office. Online at 
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AC00DD79-76D6-4FE3-91A1-
6A56B03C092F/0/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf  (last accessed 04/06/2008). 
25. Ibid. pp. 9-11.   
26. Claire Annesley and Francesca Gains, “Feminising Politics and Policy: The Impact of New 
Labour”. Paper presented at the UK PSA Women and Politics Annual Conference, Feminist Ethics, 
Feminist Politics and the States We’re In, 11 February (2006) Edinburgh. Online at: 
http://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/gradschool/psafem/pdf/FeminisingPolitics.pdf   (last accessed 04/06/2008) 
27. See p. 20, Cm 6994. 2006. The Future of the UK's Nuclear Deterrent. Presented to Parliament by 
The Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
By Command of Her Majesty. London: The Stationary Office. Online at 
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AC00DD79-76D6-4FE3-91A1-
6A56B03C092F/0/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf (last accessed 04/06/2008). Emphasis added. 
10 
recognises the UK’s status (along with that of the US, France, Russia and China) as a 
nuclear weapon state.
28
  Indeed, there is a strong tension in the White Paper between 
the government’s wish to maintain its masculinised pre-eminence as a nuclear state 
and its concurrent desire to claim the moral high ground with an ethical dimension to 
its foreign policy. There is an entire section of the White Paper, for example, devoted 
to the Government’s efforts to work toward disarmament, counter-proliferation and its 
legal obligations,
29
 indicating the importance of placating internal critics. Such 
considerations, however, cannot be allowed to trump the arguments for Trident 
renewal. The tension between the two claims to status in the international system―as 
a nuclear weapons state and as an ethical leader―can be seen in the close and rather 
jarring juxtaposition throughout the White Paper of statements about the importance 
of nuclear weapons with assertions of sharp reductions in their scale and readiness. 
One example of what amounts to a kind of paradoxical boasting about the smallness 
of the British nuclear armoury can be found in the Foreword, as then Prime Minister 
Tony Blair writes: 
 
I believe it is crucial that, for the foreseeable future, British Prime 
Ministers have the necessary assurance that no aggressor can escalate a 
crisis beyond UK control. An independent deterrent ensures our vital 
interests will be safeguarded. But as before, it will be the minimum 
necessary. We already have the smallest stockpile of nuclear warheads 
among the recognised nuclear weapons States, and are the only one to 
have reduced to a single deterrent system.
30
 
 
                                                 
28.Ibid. p. 14, emphasis added. 
28. Ibid, p. 12-16. 
30. Ibid. pp.5.  
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Such bland descriptors as “stockpiles” and “deterrent system” bring us to the second 
strand of the feminist critique of the way in which states talk about nuclear weapons 
technology: the tendency to use highly ‘abstract, euphemistic and acronym-ridden 
language’.31 This point was developed by Cohn in her work on US defence 
intellectuals, in which she identified the deployment of terms such as ‘collateral 
damage’, ‘damage limitation weapon’ and ‘clean bombs’ as part of a discourse she 
labeled ‘technostrategic’.32  Such a discourse leaves out ‘the emotional, the concrete, 
the particular, human bodies and their vulnerability, human lives and their 
subjectivity—all of which are marked [as] feminine’.33 For a member of the defence 
community to speak of such things would mean they risk being discredited and 
disempowered in the male-dominated world in which they operate. Conversely, 
ignoring such things helps defence intellectuals insulate themselves from the realities 
and consequences of their work.  
 
We suggest this dynamic can also be seen in the way the UK government talks about 
nuclear weapons in the White Paper.  There are no more than a couple of fleeting 
references to the weapons’ uniquely ‘terrifying power’34―and those only to 
underscore their deterrent capacity against ‘a future aggressor’ and certainly not as a 
way of opening up discussion about their impact on human bodies and communities. 
                                                 
31. Carol Cohn, “Emasculating America’s Linguistic Deterrent”, in Adrienne Harris and Ynestra King 
(eds) Rocking the Ship of State: Toward A Feminist Peace Politics, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1989), p.156. 
32. Carol Cohn, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defence Intellectuals,” Signs: Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society 12:4 (1987). 
33. Carol Cohn,  Felicity Hill and Sara Ruddick, ‘The Relevance of Gender for Eliminating Weapons 
of Mass Destruction’, Disarmament Diplomacy Issue 80: 1, Autumn (2005) p.5, online at 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd80/80ccfhsr.htm (last accessed 04/06/2008)  
34. See pp 5 and 17 of Cm 6994. 2006. The Future of the UK's Nuclear Deterrent. Presented to 
Parliament by The Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, By Command of Her Majesty. London: The Stationary Office. Online at 
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AC00DD79-76D6-4FE3-91A1-
6A56B03C092F/0/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf (last accessed 04/06/2008). 
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Further, although the Government is keen to assert that it only wishes to have nuclear 
weapons as a deterrent, it also acknowledges that the concept of deterrence only 
makes sense if the threat of using the weapons is credible. This means it has to 
entertain the possibility of actually using them, albeit in a highly abstracted way in 
which the consequences of so doing are not discussed. Thus buried in the heart of the 
White Paper lies a statement implying the abandonment of the long-held second-strike 
doctrine and asserting the right to use nuclear weapons pre-emptively: ‘we will not 
rule in or out the first use of nuclear weapons’.35 
  
This has enormous implications in terms of the supposedly defensive posture of the 
UK as well as potential human cost, but the employment of euphemisms such as ‘use 
of our nuclear deterrent’ and ‘use of our nuclear capabilities’36 serves to obscure what 
is really being talked about here. Later the White Paper notes that ‘Any state that we 
can hold responsible for assisting a nuclear attack on our vital interests can expect that 
this would lead to a proportionate response’.37 Again, the notion of a ‘proportionate 
response’ sounds appropriately reasonable and vague, and the realities of retaliation 
and nuclear war are neatly avoided. Similar moves are made during the more 
technical discussion of possible weapons systems. Look, for example, at the following 
statement: ‘We need to make a judgement on the minimum destructive capability 
necessary to provide an effective deterrent posture … we believe that our existing 
capability to deploy up to 48 warheads on the submarine is sufficient’.38 This sounds 
very restrained until we remember that 48 warheads comprise a total explosive power 
                                                 
35. Ibid. p. 18. 
36.Ibid,p.18. 
37.Ibid. p. 19. 
38.Ibid. p. 23. 
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of around 19 megatons (more than 1,400 times the power of the Hiroshima bomb, 
which killed 140,000 people).  
 
Interestingly, Cohn argues that it is not, ultimately, technostrategic language that is 
mobilised to justify nuclear weapons and decisions about their deployment and use. 
Rather, defence intellectuals and others rely for this task on ‘much more primitive 
ambiguous and contradictory axioms’—by insisting, for example, on the importance 
of ‘enhancing our deterrence’ and ‘protecting our vital interests’.39 As Cohn points 
out,
40
 such axioms (assertions of fact or principle that are taken as self-evident, not 
requiring evidence or explanation), fail to provide grounds for discrimination between 
different defence systems; moreover they remove the need for explicit justification of 
the need for nuclear weapons in the first place. A reliance on axioms is particularly 
evident in the White Paper.
41
 They include the following: ‘For 50 years our 
independent nuclear deterrent has provided the ultimate assurance of our national 
security’; ‘We believe that an independent British nuclear deterrent is an essential part 
of our insurance against the uncertainties and risks of the future’;42 and most 
strikingly, 
 
The fundamental principles relevant to nuclear deterrence have not changed 
since the end of the Cold War, and are unlikely to change in future … Nuclear 
                                                 
39. Carol Cohn, “Emasculating America’s Linguistic Deterrent”, in Adrienne Harris and Ynestra King 
(eds) Rocking the Ship of State: Toward A Feminist Peace Politics, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1989), p.158. 
40. Ibid. pp.158-160. 
41. This point is also made by Rebecca Johnson, “The UK White Paper on Renewing Trident: The 
Wrong Decision at the Wrong Time,” Disarmament Diplomacy issue 83, Winter (2006). Online at 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd83/83uk.htm (last accessed 05/06/2008).  
42. Both p.5 of Cm 6994. 2006. The Future of the UK's Nuclear Deterrent. Presented to Parliament by 
The Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
By Command of Her Majesty. London: The Stationary Office. Online at 
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AC00DD79-76D6-4FE3-91A1-
6A56B03C092F/0/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf (last accessed 04/06/2008). 
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weapons remain a necessary element of the capability we need to deter threats 
from others possessing nuclear weapons.
43
  
 
As Cohn points out, such axioms operate in ‘a realm where gender is just below the 
surface’.44 What she means by this is that the axioms gain their credence and 
‘emotional valences’ because they mobilise underlying assumptions about the state 
and about security which are suffused with gendered, and specifically masculine 
imagery.
45
 This is the third strand of the feminist critique of the way in which states 
talk about nuclear technology. Cohn’s assertion gains strong support from other 
feminist work, particularly that in the discipline of International Relations (IR), which 
has developed an extensive critique of the gendered underpinnings of dominant 
conceptions of both the state and security. Such work focuses its critique particularly 
on Realism, a school of thought that sees the world as an anarchic system of self-
interested states struggling to defend themselves through military power. Since World 
War Two, Realism has been the dominant approach in IR as well as among statesmen, 
policy makers and defence intellectuals, and the UK is no exception.  As we will 
show below, the Realist world view is a masculinised one, in which ‘manly’ states 
strive for self-reliance and security.  
 
Part 2: Gender and Security Discourse 
 
Feminists in IR problematise the Realist approach to security on several grounds. 
Most obviously, they question why military threats from other states (or, more 
                                                 
43. Ibid. p.17. 
44. Carol Cohn, “Emasculating America’s Linguistic Deterrent”, in Adrienne Harris and Ynestra King 
(eds) Rocking the Ship of State: Toward A Feminist Peace Politics, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1989), p.160. 
45. Ibid. p.161  
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recently, from terrorist groups) are considered more important and immediate than the 
threat to human life posed by poverty, HIV/AIDS, environmental destruction or 
domestic abuse, all of which are claimed to disproportionately affect women. As a 
corollary, they challenge the Realist reliance on destructive military technology, 
insisting that welfare budgets do more to provide genuine security for women than 
increased defence spending.
46
 Feminists also seek to undermine the view that security 
is something which can be possessed or guaranteed by the state. Instead, they have 
urged us to understand security as a process, immanent in our relationships with 
others, and always partial, elusive and contested. Conceived in this way, it must 
involve subjects—including women—in the provision of their own security.47  
 
Two gendered aspects of Realist conceptions of security are particularly important for 
our purposes. First, Realists correlate security with invulnerability, invincibility and 
impregnability. This is strongly evident in the White Paper. It is claimed, for example, 
that: 
 
The rationale for continuous deterrent patrolling (which the UK has 
maintained since 1969)… is that the submarine on patrol is invulnerable to an 
attack. For example, we are confident that our SSBNs [Ballistic Missile 
                                                 
46. See, for example, Charlotte Bunch, “A Feminist Human Rights Lens on Human Security”. Centre 
for Women's Global Leadership (2003), online at: 
http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/globalcenter/charlotte/humansecurity.pdf (last accessed 05/06/2008); V. 
Spike Peterson, V. “Security and Sovereign States: What is at Stake in Taking Feminism Seriously?”, 
in V. Spike Peterson (ed.) Gendered States: Feminist (Re)visions of International Relations Theory 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp.31-64; Jan Jindy Pettman, Worlding Women: A Feminist 
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Submarines] on deterrent patrol have remained completely undetected by a 
hostile or potentially hostile state. This means we have an assured nuclear 
deterrent available at all times.
48
 
 
As Susannah Radstone has argued, however, invulnerability is an unachievable 
fantasy with obviously gendered connotations. It is the female body that is penetrated 
and impregnated while the male body remains, or ought to remain, intact and 
impermeable.
49
 Moreover, as argued above, nuclear technologies do not operate in a 
social vacuum. They are created and operated by humans and, as such, there can be no 
guarantees of infallibility. Indeed, the world may be decidedly less secure when 
submarines armed with nuclear missiles are continuously on patrol, but the emphasis 
in the White Paper on protection through superior technology makes this possibility 
unthinkable. 
 
Second, and perhaps more important, Realist views of security cast the state and its 
military wing as ‘protector’ and civilians within the state as ‘protected’, a dichotomy 
which is profoundly gendered. Judith Hicks Stiehm, for instance, highlights the 
historical association of the protector role with men and the protected role with 
women; further, she claims that the protector role gains meaning and status precisely 
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through its privileging over those who are feminised as vulnerable.
50
  As Iris Marion 
Young put it more recently:  
 
The role of the masculine protector puts those protected, 
paradigmatically women and children, in a subordinate position of 
dependence and obedience. To the extent that citizens of a democratic 
state allow their leaders to adopt a stance of protectors toward them, 
these citizens come to occupy a subordinate status like that of women 
in the patriarchal household. We are to accept a more authoritarian and 
paternalistic state power, which gets its support partly from the unity a 
threat produces and our gratitude for protection.
51
 
 
Although recent years have seen the increasing integration of women into the armed 
forces in many developed states, the resistance to this process and the anomalies to 
which it gives rise demonstrates for many feminists that this gendering of roles 
around protection still runs deep.
52
 Furthermore, the gendered protector/protected 
dichotomy still works in symbolic terms. Thus discourses of state protection remain 
saturated with constructions of ‘masculine autonomy (freedom, control, heroics) and 
feminine dependency (passivity, vulnerability, woman as adored but also despised)’.53  
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Moreover, feminists and others have pointed out that security discourse involves an 
enforced linkage between the protector and protected in the face of an external threat. 
For Stiehm this functions to mask the fact that the biggest danger to the protected may 
actually not come from outside the state but from the hyper-masculinised protectors 
themselves.
54
 More recent poststructuralist-influenced work has made this 
relationship between the state and an external threat in Realist thought, or between 
state identity and ‘the Other’, central to their analyses. Although ‘the Other’ may 
seem radically different from ‘us’, for poststructuralists, it is our understanding of the 
Other which in part constitutes the self.
55
 As feminists then point out, the self-other 
dichotomy frequently has gendered, as well as sexualised and racialised, dimensions. 
That the Other is frequently feminised, serving to underpin a masculine or hyper-
masculine response, can be seen in examples ranging from colonial conceptions of 
virgin territories populated by compliant, exotic populations, to the treatment of 
prisoners at Abu Ghraib.
56
 Alternatively, ‘the Other’ may be portrayed as having a 
deficient, gross masculinity in contrast to the rationality and restraint of ‘ourselves’.57 
Thus different kinds of masculinities may be mobilised in security discourses, serving 
to differentiate a particular state government in the eyes of its population from its 
enemies and to legitimate its protector role.  
 
                                                 
54. Judith Hicks Stiehm “The Protected, The Protector, The Defender,” Women's Studies International 
Forum 5: 3/4 (1982), pp. 373-4; J.Ann Tickner, “You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements 
between Feminists and IR Theorists,” International Studies Quarterly 41:4 (1997), p. 627. 
55. Lene Hansen, Security as Practice ( London and New York: Routledge, 2006).  
56. Cynthia Enloe, Manoeuvers: The International Politics of Militarising Women's Lives 
(Berkeley:University of California Press, 2000);  Joshua Goldstein,  War and Gender: How Gender 
Shapes the War System and Vice Versa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.356; 
Timothy Kaufman-Osborn, “Gender Trouble at Abu Ghraib?,” Politics and Gender 1:4 (2005), pp. 
597-619. 
57. Marysia Zalewski and Cynthia Enloe. “Questions about Identity in International Relations,” in Ken 
Booth and Steve Smith (eds) International Relations Theory Today  (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 
pp. 291-293.  
19 
The identity of the UK state as Protector comes through strongly in the White Paper. 
Blair’s foreword opens with the statement that ‘The primary responsibility of any 
government is to ensure the safety and security of its citizens’58 and this is echoed 
throughout the document with numerous references to responsibility and specifically 
‘responsibilities to protect the current and future citizens of the UK’.59 As well as 
establishing a gendered binary between the masculine, strong protector and the 
feminized, vulnerable population, this serves to delegitimise any opposition to nuclear 
weapons. Disarmament strategies become irresponsible and ‘imprudent’,60 lacking in 
crucial masculine-associated traits. It is in this way that challenges to the nuclear-
protector role are positioned as emasculating, rendering the British state not only 
incapable of protecting its citizens but at risk of losing its independence and 
leadership status. 
 
In terms of an implied contrast to an external, threatening ‘Other’, the White Paper 
relies heavily on axioms about nuclear weapons ‘deterring blackmail and acts of 
aggression’ from opponents,61 thus constructing a deceitful and coercive enemy which 
wields its nuclear weapons in a fundamentally different and less responsible way than 
the UK. There is considerable uncertainly and ambiguity, however, about who the 
enemy Other actually is. Indeed, no specific aggressor can be named, as the White 
Paper acknowledges: ‘Currently no state has both intent to threaten our vital interests 
and the capability to do so with nuclear weapons’.62 
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Given this rather glaring absence, the White Paper falls back on a strongly Realist 
emphasis on the dangers posed by the uncertainty of an anarchical international 
system, in which no one can ever be fully trusted. The section on ‘the policy context’ 
for the Trident decision is particularly interesting here. We are told that ‘proliferation 
risks remain’,63 that the number of states with nuclear weapons continues to increase, 
and that existing nuclear arsenals are being modernised. The White Paper then refers 
readers to a box on the next page for ‘more details’, yet here we find no evidence of 
specific threats but rather information on all nuclear weapons states: those recognised 
by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (the US, Russia, France and China) and ‘other states’ 
(India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel). This is reinforced in a subsequent 
discussion entitled ‘re-emergence of a major nuclear threat’ which hints at the 
possibility of NATO allies in the future ‘put[ting] us under threat’.64 There is no 
consideration of how likely (or not) this possibility may be. In short, the White Paper 
is forced to rely on decontextualised and rather tenuous generalisations about all 
states as potential enemy Others in order to justify Trident renewal—regardless of 
their intent or capability, or our relationship to them.  
 
Further, the White Paper fastens on one particular type of state as particularly 
threatening, that is ‘weak and failing states’ which ‘offer safe havens for international 
terrorists and potentially create wider instability’.65 We suggest that the word 
‘terrorist’ performs an important function here, one reinforced by a discussion later in 
the same section of ‘state-sponsored terrorism’ and of the hope that the British nuclear 
deterrent might influence the decision-making process of any state considering 
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transferring nuclear technology to terrorists. The reader is reminded that this policy of 
nuclear rearmament is being considered in the context of the so-called ‘War on 
Terror’, frequently (and problematically) conceived in Manichean terms of a global 
struggle between good and evil, the civilised and barbaric. Such a binary framework 
is explicitly constructed in Tony Blair’s foreword: ‘We must assume that the global 
struggle in which we are engaged today between moderation and extremism will 
continue for a generation or more’.66 It seems to us that this War on Terror discourse 
serves not only to reinforce the Realist worldview that all states are potential enemy 
Others, but also to expand the sense of fear and threat still further to include non-state 
actors. Indeed, the enemy may be within our own state. Although this contributes to 
the general climate of fear that can be used to help justify the renewal of Trident, it 
also leads to yet another tension in the White Paper because, as the Government 
acknowledges, ‘our nuclear deterrent is not designed to deter non-state actors’.67 
Nuclear weapons are indiscriminate in their effects and cannot be used to pick off 
terrorists from the civilian populations in which they embed themselves. Further, the 
Faustian pact of nuclear deterrence logic only works with other nuclear states. Thus 
‘weak and failing’ states have to do an awful lot of work in the White Paper, as a kind 
of vector of ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ against which the British state can legitimise 
itself and must protect its population. Yet simultaneously the ‘weakness’ of the states 
concerned is emphasised. In sum, in the absence of an obvious threatening enemy 
Other, the White Paper is forced to rely on vague axioms and problematic and 
contradictory Other constructions to justify its Protector role and the renewal of 
Trident. 
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A final point of interest about the Protector identity that is so prominent in the White 
Paper is that it appears to be adopted reluctantly rather than with relish. This 
reluctance is implied in phrases such as ‘We would not want to have available the 
terrifying power of these weapons unless we believed that to be necessary to deter a 
future aggressor’,68 and it is reinforced by the emphasis placed on efforts that the UK 
has made to reduce its nuclear stockpile. It could even be said that the picture of Blair 
in the foreword captures some of this reluctance. He is suited, serious, authoritative, 
but grimacing slightly and not looking directly at the viewer. The impression is of a 
man taking on a burden. This is no doubt in part because he knew many of his 
political colleagues were going to be deeply opposed to Trident renewal (indeed, Blair 
himself was once a member of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament). This 
‘Reluctant Protector’ knows he has to tone down the more bravura aspects of 
masculinised security discourse if he is to convince his readership of the need to 
renew nuclear weapons in this post-Cold War era. Nonetheless, the weighty task of 
renewing nuclear deterrence is one that he, as ‘Responsible Steward’, remains 
prepared to take on.
69
  
 
Part 3: Gender and the State in International Relations  
 
The previous section discussed the masculine character of the identity of the 
‘Protector’; in the next, we go on to address the masculine identity of the state more 
generally. In the dominant Realist view, upheld by both mainstream academics and 
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the majority of policy maker states are ‘unitary actors whose internal characteristics, 
beyond an assessment of their relative capabilities, are not seen as necessary for 
understanding their vulnerabilities or security-enhancing behaviour’.70 This 
assumption that states act as coherent units draws its strength from their treatment as 
‘notional persons’ in early modern jurisprudence. 71 Relatedly, the state is understood 
to be independent, signified by the status of sovereignty, which entails a claim not 
only to authority within a territory but to independence from, and legal equality to, 
other such authorities. Realists do not distinguish between the legal status of 
sovereignty and actual state practice; they assume that states are as independent from 
one another as they claim to be. Moreover, like a person, the state must be able to 
act—and act in particular ways. The fact of international anarchy (or lack of 
overarching government) is interpreted by realists as bringing with it a ‘self-help’ 
system in which states cannot rely on others and must seek to defend themselves or 
perish. Finally, as Alan James makes clear, the state for Realists is a fundamentally 
rational actor:  
 
The state is said to behave rationally because it is pictured as bending its 
efforts in a consistent and calculated way towards a clearly-established goal. 
And it can be so depicted because it is a single unit. The analogy is with the 
sober and mature man who gives careful thought to the achievement of his 
purposes.
72
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As this quote indicates, the Realist state is a ‘manly state’.73 We can see here the 
systematic mobilising of gendered dichotomies such as active/passive, 
independent/(inter)dependent, and rational/irrational, and the assumption that the state 
fits with the masculine side of the dichotomies.  Needless to say, the model of 
rationality James describes has been critiqued by countless feminist philosophers. 
Proponents of this model are accused of neglecting social context, both in terms of the 
domestic labour and relationships that make the processes of rational decision making 
possible, and in terms of the consequences of the rational decisions made. As Jacqui 
True points out, ‘[r]ational thinkers such as men and states do not figure in their cost-
benefit analyses of foreign policies (military build-up, war mobilisation, economic 
liberalisation or protection), the social costs that are borne by ‘private’ family-
households and communities’.74 In addition, proponents of this model of rationality 
are criticised for evacuating emotional and ethical dimensions of thought, historically 
gendered feminine, as highlighted in our discussion above about the limitations of 
technostrategic discourse.  
 
If Realism’s epistemology (its underlying conception of knowledge) is gendered, its 
ontology (its underlying conception about the self and agency) is equally so. 
Feminists would argue that James’s analogy comparing the state to a man is not 
accidental but intrinsic to how the state is understood: this is ‘an exclusionary 
masculine model of agency derived from a context of unequal gender relations, where 
primarily women’s child rearing and care-giving work supports the development of 
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autonomous male selves’.75 In order to appear unitary, active and independent, then, 
these selves must mask their internal fractures, the constraints and tendencies to 
inertia that they might face, and their relations of (inter)dependency on internal and 
external others. Indeed, as Spike Peterson points out (in a demonstration of the close 
linkage here with gendered protection discourses),  
 
Dependency is demeaning, a status indicative of subordination and one 
shunned by the free man … being protected is an identity to be avoided as 
much as possible. This version of protection constructs dependency in narrow, 
dichotomous terms that obscure (inter)dependent relations as a pervasive 
feature of social reality.
76
 
 
These dimensions of state identity can all be found in the White Paper. For example, 
the unitary, coherent character of the UK is constantly emphasised through the use of 
several rhetorical techniques. Several of these can be seen in the following sentences 
from section 1:  
  
1.1: The United Kingdom is committed to helping to secure international 
peace and security. Since 1956, the UK’s nuclear deterrent has underpinned 
our ability to do so, even in the most challenging circumstances … we have 
employed our nuclear forces strictly as a means to deter acts of aggression 
against our vital interests … 
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1.2 Our manifesto at the 2005 General Election made a commitment to retain 
the UK’s existing nuclear deterrent.77 
  
What can be seen here is, first, the use of the collective pronoun ‘we’ and its 
possessive form ‘our’ to equate both with the UK state and the current Government, 
often in close proximity. This is done throughout the text, and it serves to legitimise 
the current regime by masking internal debates, fusing this Government with past 
ones and Government with State. Second, the ‘vital interests’ and actions of the state 
and the people within it are also fused, masking any disjuncture between citizens and 
their government. Third, the unified, coherent and even strong nature of the UK state 
is established through an implicit contrast with the ‘weak and failing states’ 
emphasised above as a key enemy Other in the White Paper. While there are a couple 
of slippages in this construction, with two passing references to past Governments and 
an occasional acknowledgement of internal opposition to the Government’s plans on 
Trident, the overriding impression is of a state that thinks and acts as one.  
 
The way in which this thinking and acting are presented are key to the masculine 
character of the construction. Specifically, the capacity of the British state for rational 
decision making and then to act decisively and unhindered is constantly emphasised. 
As the executive summary states: ‘We have thus decided to take the steps necessary to 
sustain a credible deterrent capability in the 2020s and beyond’.78 To take the 
rationality part of this construction first, this is constantly drawn out through an 
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explicit (if highly selective and edited) discussion of the decision making process, 
particularly in Annex B. It is clear that reasoning is conceived as the correlation of 
means and ends, thus ‘a thorough review of the widest possible range of options’ was 
undertaken
79
 in order to see how the goal of maintenance of the nuclear deterrence 
could be achieved. ‘Our manifesto at the 2005 General Election made a commitment 
to retain the UK’s existing nuclear deterrent … We have now reached the point at 
which procurement decisions are necessary’.80 The rationality at work here is 
decontextualised and strategic, focused only on how best to uphold a pre-set objective 
(there is no discussion, for example, of the possibility of disarmament as an 
alternative goal). Further, this mode of reasoning involves undertaking a cost-benefit 
analysis when assessing the best means to obtain that objective. Concretely, this 
means that the relative power and vulnerability of various nuclear systems are 
compared, along with their price.
81
 There is, as already mentioned above, no attention 
to the human cost of using the bomb, nor to the moral and emotional problems 
involved in threatening to use it.  
 
For deterrence logic to work, the British state has to attribute similar means-end, cost-
benefit analysis to other states, including ‘weak states’. These are assumed liable to 
think again when confronted by the certain expectation that ‘any attack on our vital 
interests … would lead to a proportionate response’.82 No ‘mad dictators’ or ‘rogue 
states’ here, then, for the introduction of emotional factors in state reasoning might 
threaten to unravel the masculine state identity construct on which the White Paper 
depends. But if all states are fundamentally rational on this view, there does seem to 
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be something distinctive about the way in which the reasoning process of the British 
state is presented, something which marks it as superior to its potential enemy Others. 
We would suggest that has to do with its ‘reasonable’ or ‘moderate’ character. As 
discussed above, Blair’s foreword reminds us of the War on Terror framework with 
its Manichean struggle between ‘moderation and extremism’. Thus the terrorist-
sponsoring weak states may be rational in their decision-making processes but the 
goals to which they may aspire are positioned as extreme. In contrast, the goals of the 
moderate British state are not only reasonable (the security of British citizens) but 
represent high minded moral purpose, befitting its ethical leadership role: witness the 
repeated linkage of the UK’s goals to ‘international peace and security’.83 
 
Further, the text states repeatedly that the UK has been reasonable or moderate in its 
pursuit of security: thus its nuclear arsenal has ‘been used only to deter acts of 
aggression against our vital interests, never to coerce others’.84 Again, the implied 
contrast is with extremist enemy Others, capable of ‘blackmail and acts of 
aggression’.85 It is asserted that the UK ‘would only consider using nuclear weapons 
in self defence … And even then only in extreme circumstances’86—i.e., if it was 
forced from the norm of moderation. If the abandonment of second strike doctrine, 
discussed above, should give readers pause for thought about the authenticity of this 
construction of the UK as moderate, the construct is reinforced by the association 
throughout the text of the process of British decision-making with phrases redolent of 
its reasonable character, such as ‘considered carefully’,87 ‘we must therefore be 
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realistic about our ability precisely to predict’,88 and ‘thorough review’.89 In fact, 
these phrases, along with the foregrounding of the ways in which the UK has met its 
international legal obligations in section 2 and Annex A, gives the text as a whole a 
legalistic ring. In sum, this is the masculine rationality of the prudent, scholarly 
lawyer rather than the aggressive, coercive masculinity of the pugilist or ‘extremist’. 
 
Nonetheless, the British state is, and must be, capable of decisive action. Such 
capability is central to Realist understandings of the state and shot through with 
masculine associations in contrast to feminised passivity and succumbing to 
constraint. Thus active verb constructions and descriptions of decisive action 
predominate throughout the text. The foreword and executive summary, for example, 
mention repeatedly that ‘we believe’ and ‘we have decided’.90 Even when the state is 
doing nothing, or reducing its stockpile, it is actively choosing to do so: ‘we decided 
not to take an option … We will reduce … … we have not conducted … we have 
increased our transparency … we have ceased production …. We continue to make 
progress’.91 There is also an overt emphasis on avoiding inaction or constraint. ‘[O]ur 
capacity to act’ must ‘not be constrained by nuclear blackmail by others’,92 ‘we must 
not allow such states to … deter us and the international community from taking the 
action required … or fundamentally constrain our policy options’.93 The possibility of 
a ‘dormant’ nuclear weapons capability cannot be entertained, the capability must be 
‘active’ and also ‘credible’.94 The need for British nuclear weapons capacity to be 
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‘credible’ is emphasised at several points so even if we do not act, it must be possible 
that we can, and others must believe that we can.  
 
Finally, there is a strong emphasis on the fact that the state must be able to ‘go it 
alone’. ‘An independent centre of nuclear decision-making enhances the overall 
deterrent effect of allied nuclear forces’95 and, again, ‘The UK’s nuclear forces must 
remain fully operationally independent if they are to be a credible deterrent’.96 Yet it 
seems to us there are two key tensions in the rhetoric around independence. In the first 
place, and in a move linked to the ethical leadership discourse and intended to placate 
its internal opponents, the government is also keen to insist on its ‘multilateral’ 
relationships and its participation in NATO. Significantly, the White Paper asserts 
that it is not only the demands of self-defence that could give rise to the use of nuclear 
weapons but also the need to defend NATO allies.
97
 Thus, ‘the UK’s nuclear deterrent 
supports collective security … separately controlled but mutually supporting nuclear 
forces therefore create an enhanced overall deterrent effect’.98  
 
In the second place, there is the extremely close relationship with the US. The White 
Paper asserts that the British nuclear submarines will be:  
 
fully operationally independent of the US … decision making and use 
of the system remains entirely sovereign to the UK … the US has 
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never sought to exploit our procurement relationship in this area as a 
means to influence foreign policy.
99
 
 
Nonetheless, this procurement relationship remains a very close-knit one. Although 
the new submarines are to be built in the UK,
100
 we are not told explicitly from where 
future missiles and warheads are to be obtained. The White Paper is silent on the 
long-term lease arrangements for missiles from the US.
101
 It does insist on the need to 
‘participate in the US life extension programme for the Trident D5 missile’, because 
otherwise ‘it will not be possible to retain our existing Trident D5 missiles in service 
much beyond 2020’.102 Hence the need to seek ‘assurances’ from the US government 
that the British government would be allowed to opt in to any plan to develop a 
successor to these missiles.
103
 Of course, the US government does not need to seek 
similar assurances; this is not the mutual support of multilateralism so much as the 
dependence of the UK upon the US in a subordinated and thus feminised role. These 
glimpses of co-dependence and dependence seriously undercut claims about 
independence, which may explain why such claims are repeated so frequently 
throughout the text. Complete independence is key to the construction of the unitary, 
rational, masculine state that underpins British nuclear policy, but, as so often in life, 
it is an illusion.   
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Conclusion 
 
Drawing on feminist critiques of discourses about nuclear weapons, security and the 
state, this paper has made three sets of claims about the way in which gender operates 
in the recent Government White Paper on Trident. Firstly, it seems to us that the 
White Paper draws less than expected on masculine-saturated codes when describing 
nuclear technology, but it does evacuate and devalue that which is associated with the 
feminine: emotional responses and the bodies that are affected by nuclear weapons. It 
also clings to the masculinised status that nuclear possession brings with it, albeit 
juggling this with more ethically based claims to leadership. Secondly, the White 
Paper is explicitly based on an understanding of security which argues for 
invulnerability achieved through technology rather than through relationships, and 
which privileges the masculine protector over the feminised protected―although it 
remains unclear who we are being protected from and there is some apparent 
reluctance in taking on the protector role. Thirdly, the White Paper is underpinned by 
a ‘Realist’ understanding of the state-as-actor which has a strongly masculine 
character in its emphasis on a narrow rationality and on independent action. There 
seems to us to be a significant tension here, given the relations of interdependence and 
dependence also glimpsed in the text. We also suggest there is an implied contrast in 
the text between the moderate masculinity of the British state and the more aggressive 
or extreme masculinity of enemy Others. 
 
Taken as whole, it seems to us that the White Paper constructs a distinctive, 
masculinised identity for the British nuclear state as a ‘responsible steward’.104 This is 
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a form of masculinity that remains rational, decisive and active but deliberately 
eschews the more obviously aggressive and phallic connotations of its weaponry; that 
is concerned to provide ethical leadership in the international system; that takes on the 
familiar masculine protector role, but with a degree of reluctance; and that is moderate 
and restrained in its choices and actions. We have here an interesting contrast with the 
more gung-ho forms of nuclear masculinity suggested in feminist analyses of the Cold 
War arms race. Indeed, it seems likely that there has been a significant shift in the 
identity of the British nuclear state, from a Cold War male warrior to a kind of post-
Cold War ‘new man’. Perhaps the ‘responsible steward’ is one of a range of ways that 
dominant or ‘hegemonic’ forms of masculinity have been adapted for the post-Cold 
War world order.
105
 Perhaps also there are factors here specific to the Labour 
Government and its changing personnel. Clearly, the possibility that there has been an 
epochal change in the masculine identity of the British nuclear state, and the reasons 
why, require further research and cannot be established definitively in this paper. 
 
Instead, we want to close with two points. Firstly, although hegemonic masculine 
forms may shift over time and place, such shifts are not necessarily progressive. 
Indeed, Charlotte Hooper suggests that the apparent softening of hegemonic 
masculinity characteristic of Western states in the era of globalisation is not a sign of 
the imminent demise of male power but rather part and parcel of the adjustment 
process neccessary to maintain power and status.
 106
  More precisely, she argues that 
changes in ‘masculinist practices’ work to ensure both that hegemonic masculinity 
remains hegemonic and that it continues to meet the requirements of its elite 
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masculine-identified members (usually white, middle or upper class, heterosexual 
men).
107
 If this is indeed how hegemonic masculinity operates, what we are perhaps 
observing in the White Paper is a shift in the self-image of the British state, but one 
that enables it to avoid relinquishing the masculine ideal of power and status as 
measured in nuclear weapons. The construction of the ‘responsible steward’ identity 
is thus a smokescreen, diverting attention from the lack of substantive change in 
policy. Having said this, shifts in the masculine identity of the British state remain 
significant because any disruptions to traditional definitions of masculinity 
demonstrate the arbitrariness of gendered dichotomies and open up potential for 
change.
108
 
 
This leads us onto our second point, that the construction of the ‘responsible steward’ 
identity remains far from complete. Indeed, as we indicated at several points above, 
there are several instabilities and tensions in the way in which masculine codes and 
images are mobilised in the White Paper. Most notably, it appears that the British 
nuclear state remains attracted to the status and privilege which it believes goes with 
possession of nuclear weapons, yet it also wants to develop a leadership role based on 
ethics rather than fear. Further, the role of the British nuclear state as protector of its 
citizens proves rather difficult to establish in the absence of an obvious enemy Other, 
and instead we find a problematic reliance on a fear of ‘weak states’ and a contestable 
characterisation of all states, even current allies, as potential deadly enemies. Finally, 
we see both an emphasis on the independence of the British nuclear deterrence and a 
recognition of the importance of interdependence and multilateralism—as well as an 
effort to avoid drawing attention to the dependent relationship on the United States in 
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nuclear procurement, which means full independence simply cannot be achieved. 
Such tensions in the British government’s position are indicative, perhaps, that its 
masculine underpinnings are less stable than is often assumed. We note that both 
Hooper
109
 and R. W. Connell
110
suggest that feminists can exploit the contradictions 
between ‘softer’ and ‘harder’ forms of masculinity, opening up space for alternative 
identity constructions. The tensions we have exposed in the White Paper should thus 
give those engaged in the continuing struggle against Trident renewal further fuel for 
their arguments. It seems to us that exposure and exacerbation of internal instabilities 
in the gendered discourse of nuclear weapons states remains an important feminist 
contribution to the struggle for a nuclear-free world.  
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